
Ireland assumes the six-month rotating Presidency of the European Council on 1 July, and once again it will be seeking a bailout from our EU partners, in terms of security and defence, as the country finds itself in damage control mode, scrambling for a last-minute solution to avoid an even bigger crisis, writes Dr Cathal Berry, former Irish special forces officer.
The world has changed dramatically since Ireland last took up this role in 2013. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Trump Administration’s hostility towards Greenland, have ensured that defence and security considerations are now paramount across the EU. This presents a significant challenge to Ireland on two fronts. The first is political, the second is practical.
On the political front, Ireland’s reputation as a reliable partner and credible security actor is now under the microscope. Ireland places little emphasis on its own security obligations and adopts a minimalistic approach to defence engagement with international partners. Consequently, there are significant gaps in Ireland’s defence expertise both at a political and institutional level. This will invariably undermine credibility whilst chairing summits, as forging detailed compromises is a key function of the rotating presidency.
Perhaps more pressing still are the practical considerations. The deliberate interference with Denmark’s EU presidency has raised concerns that the same meddling may occur here. Suspicious drone sightings during President Zelensky’s visit to Dublin last December have not been reassuring. Particularly as the State apparatus appeared completely incapable of responding to even this relatively minor security incident.
Since 2022 other EU countries have upgraded their military capability in the wake of Russia’ s invasion of Ukraine. The number of Irish troops, however, has fallen by a further 7% during this time.
APPALING POLITICAL GOVERNANCE
Incredibly, we now have 500 less troops than we did even four years ago. Our Naval Service lacks any underwater capability to protect our critical seabed infrastructure, our Air Corps cannot even monitor our airspace let alone intercept rogue aircraft, while the Army’s specialised Air Defence Regiment was inexplicably disbanded in 2012 despite protestations from the military.

LE Eithne, built in Cork and equipped with a helideck, hull mounted sonar and an air surveillance radar, was decommissioned in 2022.
Furthermore, the Defence Forces Cyber Command, launched with great fanfare in 2025, consists of only three soldiers. Once again, we must distinguish between rhetoric and reality. From a hybrid perspective, Ireland is a sitting duck. So, how did it come to this?
The political governance of our armed forces has been appalling. The downgrading of both the senior and junior Defence ministers to part-time roles in 2012 demonstrates the complete lack of attention and prioritisation given to defence and security matters.
Furthermore, the allocated budget is so small that 60% of it goes on salaries and pensions, leaving precious little for the conduct of operations and crucial capital investment.
Despite being deployed in an active drone zone in South Lebanon for years, our Defence Forces still do not possess a single piece of counter-drone equipment.


